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Abstract
When process fairness deviates from outcome fairness, dynamic inconsistencies can arise as
in nonexpected utility. Resolute choice (Machina) can restore dynamic consistency under
nonexpected utility without using Strotz’s precommitment. It can similarly justify
dynamically consistent process fairness.
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21. Introduction
Experimental studies have demonstrated the importance of fairness considerations in
numerous strategic settings. Formal models have been developed for fairness preferences
with many applications, e.g. in analyses of contracts. Two formal concepts are intention-
based reciprocity and outcome-based inequity aversion. Recently, process-based inequity
aversion has been proposed, which does not require a role for intentionality. Then fairness of
the outcome generating process matters rather than only the outcomes themselves, and
inequity aversion is modeled using deviations from fair expected outcomes (Bolton et al.
2005, Krawczyk 2009, Trautmann 2009). Outcome fairness, in contrast, considers deviations
from fairness regarding the actually obtained outcomes.
This paper shows that process fairness generates dilemmas of the same nature as
nonexpected utility preferences do in dynamic decisions. These dilemmas are similar to
Strotz’ time inconsistency, but add a subtle role of counterfactual events. If process fairness
is relevant, i.e. deviates from outcome fairness, then its implementation requires a violation
of what is known as consequentialism (Machina 1989). Such violations will often be hard to
implement. If they are not implemented, however, then dynamic inconsistency results. Thus
under process fairness one of two natural conditions has to be abandoned, consequentialism
or dynamic consistency. Process fairness and dynamic consistency can be implemented by
commitment devices (Strotz 1955). For example, organizations typically serve as
commitment device to implement process fairness in team production settings. Machina
(1989) argued that even in the absence of commitment devices, dynamic consistency can be
maintained by what McClennen (1990) called resolute choice.
2. The Model
Consider the following Random Ultimatum Game: For a pie, a random device proposes a
share x for a responder, and a share 1x for a passive player (x  [0,1]). Assume that with
equal probability the partition is (y, 1y) or (z, 1 z). If the responder accepts, then both
players receive their respective share. Otherwise (rejection) both players receive nothing. See
Fig. 1.
3A circle (chance node) designates the random device’s proposal of shares. Squares
designate decision nodes where the proposer accepts or rejects. The outcomes are the final
allocations (x, 1x) (x = y or x = z) if acceptance, and (0,0) if rejection. At either timepoint 1
(ex ante) or at timepoint 2 (ex post) the responder announces the decisions at all future
decision nodes. If the responder announces ex ante (at 1), then she announces her decision
for both decision nodes before the uncertainty is resolved. For the actual proposal resulting
after the uncertainty has been resolved, her announced decision will then be implemented
(she cannot reconsider). If the responder announces ex post (at 2), then the uncertainty has
already been resolved in the past and the proposed allocation is (z, 1z) (in the case depicted).
She announces a decision that is immediately implemented.
Outcome fairness evaluations depend only on the realized outcomes x and 1x. Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) proposed models depending on
deviations from equality (x=½), which reduce utility. Under process fairness evaluations, x
and 1x above are replaced by, or combined with, their expectations E(x) and E(1x). Then
the outcomes at both decision nodes matter.
3. Process Fairness versus Separable Branches in the Decision Tree
Outcome fairness is consequentialist (Machina 1989): Each branch of the decision tree is
evaluated separately, as if the other counterfactual branches were non-existing. Both ex-ante













FIGURE 1. Decision tree of the responder´s dynamic decision
problem
4manner. Past events and counterfactual parts of the tree are cut and play no more role, as
illustrated in Fig. 1 for the evaluation of the upper branch. Each branch of the tree is
evaluated de novo as McClennen (1990) called it. Ex ante outcome fairness can be related to
Strotz’ (1955) sophisticated choice: the consequentialist ex-post evaluations are anticipated
ex-ante.
We will consider process fairness where the agent considers expected payoffs. Outcomes
then are not evaluated separately from counterfactual outcomes in other branches of the tree.
At both 1 and 2 the whole decision tree is taken into account. At each decision node, risks
borne in the past are obviously relevant. Such relevance is the essence of Machina’s (1989)
resolute choice. Thus process fairness gives a convincing application of his idea, formalizing
his Parental Example (Machina 1989, pp. 1643-1644). In Fig. 1 let z = 0 and y= 1. Then in 2
the responder facing the disadvantageous allocation (0, 1), unfair from an outcome
perspective, accepts the offer because of her past chance of receiving (1, 0), which would
have given her the whole pie. Good counterfactual outcomes impact on a bad outcome
actually faced, making it acceptable.
4. The Danger of Dynamic Inconsistency for Fairness Preferences
Table 1 organizes possible combinations of decision time (ex post or ex ante) and
decision perspective (process or outcome fairness). All four combinations are potentially
conceivable. Dynamic consistency implies the same model before and after the resolution of
uncertainty (either P1 and P2, or O1 and O2). Machina explicitly defended the rationality of
dynamic consistency even in the absence of commitment devices, arguing that risks borne in
the past continue to be relevant at present. This justifies ex-post procedural fairness; see the
solid arrow in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Dynamic Consistency under Process and Outcome Fairness
Ex-ante announcement 1 Ex-post announcement 2
Process fairness P1 P2
Outcome fairness O1 O2
5The dashed arrow is empirically most plausible. In the ex-ante point 1 the whole
decision tree is salient enhancing process fairness. Ex-post (2), however, the actually
selected outcome allocation is most salient and counterfactual branches may be ignored. The
latter consequentialist evaluation enhances outcome fairness ex post. Emotional factors
support the dashed arrow (Bosman, Sutter, & van Winden 2005; Loewenstein, 1996). It leads
to violations of dynamic consistency of the same nature as commonly observed under
nonexpected utility (Cubitt, Starmer, & Sugden, 2004; Kahneman and Tversky 1979,
isolation; Tversky and Kahneman 1986, pseudo-certainty; Volij, 1994) and similar to
dynamic inconsistencies in intertemporal choice (Strotz, 1955; Thaler, 1981). Procrastination,
undersaving, and unsuccessful dieting are some of the many resulting phenomena. Dynamic
inconsistency is also central to macro-economics (Kydland & Prescott 1977), where strategic
considerations as in subgame perfectness play a role.
Every parent of two or more children can document anecdotal evidence on dynamic
inconsistencies by a child who, after an a priori fair process, ends up with an ex post
unfavorable outcome. Yet we are not aware of explicit reports of dynamic inconsistency in
the fairness literature. There is clear evidence for the process view in ex-ante evaluations
(Blount 1995; Bolton et al. 2005; Bolton and Ockenfels 2010). In ex-post evaluations,
outcome fairness is more frequent although there is also some evidence for process fairness
(Charness 2004; Cox and Deck 2005; Offerman 2002; van den Bos et al. 1997). These
separate findings, if combined, suggest that dynamic inconsistencies will be common in
fairness evaluations. No study as yet has, however, explicitly investigated such dynamic
inconsistencies. Given the novelty of process fairness in the literature, this is an important
topic for future research.
5. Organizations as Devices to Promote the Process Fairness Perspective
In the case of process and outcome fairness as for the dashed arrow in Table 1,
organizations can serve as a commitment device to restore dynamic consistency. In team
productions settings, outcomes are often indivisible (such as the allocation of attractive tasks).
Then process fairness increases welfare by inducing inequity averse agents to participate.
Organizations can promote the process view directly, so that agents will not reduce their
utility for unequal outcomes. Alternatively, consider repeated settings where agents
sometimes obtain more attractive projects and sometimes less attractive ones than their
6colleagues. Then contracts can guarantee participation even if agents obtain negative social
utility from intermediate tasks, as long as the long term payoffs are positive. Studying the
new models of process fairness in team production settings with dynamic inconsistency is a
promising route to obtain insights into a new mechanism for the restoration of efficiency by
firms where markets cannot provide such efficiency.
6. Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that the implementation of process fairness and outcome
fairness generates the same dilemmas as the implementation of nonexpected utility in
dynamic decisions. These dilemmas are similar to Strotz’ time inconsistency. Machina’s
(1989) resolute choice can justify process fairness even if no commitment device is available.
Conversely, process fairness can serve to provide psychological background for Machina’s
resolute choice.
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